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Abstract 
Against the background of the changing relationships between trade unions and po-
litical parties in Western Europe, this paper examines the nature and outcomes of 
union–party alliances in East Central Europe. The paper advances two interrelated 
arguments. First, the nature of union–party ties in postcommunism is significantly 
different and can be best described as an inverse dependency relationship in which 
political parties have always been the stronger partner. Second, contrary to the con-
ventional assumptions based on the experience of Western Europe, strong union–
party ties have worked to the detriment of labor in East Central Europe. This paradox 
is explained by poor reserves of loyalty, which are a direct consequence of the absence 
of a long history of close ties and mutually beneficial exchanges. The way in which 
such new alliances respond to economic imperatives is not likely to be affected by 
commitment concerns, but rather by the balance of power in the relationship. Given 
the fact that the balance of power is tilted towards parties, disloyal behavior is more 
likely to occur on the side of political parties than on that of the unions. In particular, 
in the context of pervasive economic constraints and limited party competition over 
economic policy issues, strong ties with the unions increase parties’ incentives to co-
opt union leaders in the task of communicating the necessity of reforms to their con-
stituencies. 
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Vor dem Hintergrund des sich in Westeuropa vollziehenden Wandels der Beziehun-
gen zwischen Gewerkschaften und politischen Parteien untersucht das Papier Ausprä-
gung und Auswirkungen der Allianzen zwischen Parteien und Gewerkschaften in Mit-
tel- und Osteuropa. Das Papier entwickelt zwei zentrale Argumente. (1) Die Bezie-
hungen zwischen Gewerkschaften und Parteien im Postkommunismus unterscheiden 
sich entscheidend von den westeuropäischen Erfahrungen und können am treffends-
ten als Beziehungen „umgekehrter Abhängigkeit“ beschrieben werden, in denen die 
politischen Parteien immer die stärkeren Partner sind. (2) Im Gegensatz zu den Erfah-
rungen Westeuropas haben starke Bindungen zwischen Gewerkschaften und Parteien 
den Arbeitnehmerinteressen in Mittel- und Osteuropa geschadet. Dieses Paradox ist 
mit mangelnden Loyalitätsreserven zu erklären, die wiederum durch das Fehlen einer 
Tradition enger und auf gegenseitigem Nutzen beruhenden Beziehungen begründet 
sind. Die Art und Weise, wie solch neue Allianzen auf wirtschaftliche Notwendigkei-
ten antworten, wird weniger von Loyalitätsüberlegungen als vielmehr von dem in den 
Beziehungen herrschenden Machtverhältnis beeinflusst. Da die Macht der Parteien 
größer ist, neigen sie eher zu Loyalitätsbrüchen als die Gewerkschaften. In Anbetracht 
der extremen wirtschaftlichen Zwänge und des geringen Parteienwettbewerbs in wirt-
schaftspolitischen Fragen im Postkommunismus bieten starke Verbindungen zu den 
Gewerkschaften einen Anreiz für die Parteien, die Gewerkschaftsführer zu kooptieren, 
um ihrer Wählerschaft die Notwendigkeit von Reformen zu vermitteln. 
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1 Introduction 
The general question of the societal rootedness of political parties has long been at the 
core of research on party politics in the advanced capitalist societies. If any issue has 
dominated this literature, it has been the linkages between political parties and organ-
ized labor. Indeed, numerous analyses by sociologists, historians, and political scien-
tists pay close attention either to the origins and development, or to the transforma-
tion of union–party linkages. Notwithstanding different research questions, empirical 
foci, and methodological approaches, two broad areas of agreement have emerged in 
this literature. First, it is typically held that up to the mid-1970s, close ties between 
Left parties and trade unions in Western Europe offered the basis for a mutually bene-
ficial exchange. While the unions provided votes, and at times financial contributions, 
their political allies in government returned the favor by implementing policies and 
legislation that protected their main constituencies. The second area of agreement 
concerns the increasing strain put by broad structural and economic changes on union–
party alliances since the early 1980s. It is now widely acknowledged that these long-
standing alliances have been either weakened, or at the very least profoundly trans-
formed. 
In what follows I contribute to this literature by juxtaposing the trends in union–party 
alliances in Western Europe with those in postcommunist East Central Europe. A 
number of insightful political science accounts have broadened our understanding of 
postcommunist party systems, the character of the parties, and the patterns of pro-
grammatic competition (for example, Evans/Whitefield 1993; Innes 2001; Kitschelt et 
al. 1999; Lewis 1996). At the same time, the role of trade unions in transition and de-
mocratic consolidation in the region has also received considerable attention from 
political scientists and sociologists alike (for example, Crowley/Ost 2001; Iankova 
2002; Kubicek 2004). However, far less attention has been paid to the alliances be-
tween political parties and trade unions in postcommunism. The aim of this paper is 
to address this issue by exploring two interrelated questions, focusing on the specific 
nature and outcomes of these alliances. First, how distinctive is the nature of these links 
in postcommunism? More precisely, can the structural factors that have so fundamen-
tally altered union–party alliances in the West provide a sufficient explanation of the 
nature of these links in the East? Second, to what extent have these alliances been 
beneficial for trade unions in East Central Europe? Have these connections enabled 
                                                        
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 14th International Conference of Europeanists, 
Chicago, March 11–13, 2004, and at the workshop “The End of Labor Politics?” held at the Max 
Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, June 17–18, 2004. Comments from partici-
pants in both meetings – and in particular from Jonathan Hopkin, Herbert Kitschelt, Wolfgang 
Merkel, Wolfgang Streeck, Christine Trampusch, and Helmut Wiesenthal – are gratefully acknowl-
edged. This version has benefited from detailed comments and suggestions by Ian Greer and Britta 
Rehder. 
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unions to mitigate the economic hardships of postcommunist reforms by securing 
specific social policies or laws aimed at the protection of employees’ interests? 
To answer these questions, I contrast the historical development of union–party alli-
ances in the two regions. I argue that the nature of these ties in East Central Europe is 
fundamentally different, and can be characterized as an inverse dependency relationship 
in which political parties have always been the stronger partner. The absence of his-
torically close ties and the lack of a tradition of mutually beneficial exchanges indicate 
very poor reserves of loyalty in postcommunist union–party alliances. However, this 
does not mean that both partners are equally prone to engage in disloyal behavior. 
The fact that the unions have been experiencing a rapid decline in membership, in-
tense inter-union competition, and widespread negative perceptions puts them in a 
much weaker position vis-à-vis political parties. Due to such asymmetric power dis-
tribution, disloyal behavior is more likely to occur on the side of political parties 
rather than their labor allies. In the context of pervasive economic constraints, which 
preclude inter-party competition with regard to economic policy options, strong ties 
with the unions increase parties’ incentives to co-opt union leaders, putting them in 
the service of communicating the necessity of reforms to their constituencies. Thus, 
contrary to the conventional assumption based on the West European experience, 
strong alliances with political parties are likely to work to the detriment of labor in the 
postcommunist context. 
I test this proposition on the cases of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic with 
respectively strong, partial, and non-existent formal union–party ties. Empirical 
analysis reveals that organized labor secured more beneficial policies not in the coun-
tries where unions developed strong ties with political parties, but rather where they 
preserved their independence. In the case of strong ties, union leaders regularly re-
sponded to their partisan allies by complying with, or even advocating, neoliberal 
economic reforms that imposed painful sacrifices on union members. 
The paper is divided into five sections. Section 1 outlines the development of union–
party alliances in Western Europe and presents the major arguments put forward to 
explain the weakening or changing nature of this relationship. These findings form 
the background against which I examine (section 2) the historical development of and 
the main challenges facing both unions and parties in East Central Europe. In section 
3, I draw on this discussion to present my main hypothesis regarding the nature and 
outcomes of union–party ties in the postcommunist context. Section 4 turns to the 
case studies of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and reports unconventional 
findings that support my argument. Finally, in section 5 I offer some conclusions and 
discuss the prospects of institutional learning. 
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2 Union–party alliances in Western Europe: From golden age to demise 
The origins of the union–party alliances in Western Europe can be traced back to the 
onset of industrialization in the nineteenth century and the subsequent extension of 
the franchise to male workers. This new “reservoir of working class votes” fuelled the 
growth of socialist and labor parties (Piven 1992: 2). At the same time, unions sought 
to strengthen their organizations by achieving parliamentary representation for their 
members. In some countries unions either founded these parties (Britain and Ire-
land), or were actively involved in their founding (Denmark and Norway). In others, 
socialist parties helped establish the unions (Sweden), or different parties set up their 
own unions (Italy, France, Germany) (Streeck/Hassel 2003; Beyme 1985; Western 
1997). The nature of union–party relations and the patterns of their subsequent de-
velopment varied considerably across countries depending on such factors as the on-
set and pace of industrialization, the degree of state repression, the timing of the es-
tablishment of the unions vis-à-vis their allied party, or the importance of religious 
and political cleavages within both party and union systems (Lipset 1983; Marks 1989; 
Streeck/Hassel 2003; Valenzuela 1991). This variation notwithstanding, union–party 
alliances were in general considered to represent “political and industrial wings of a 
united working class movement” (Hayward 1980: 5). 
With the end of the Second World War and subsequent economic development, West 
European labor movements underwent significant reorganization, which in many 
cases led to unification or a tempering of union divisions. Unions abandoned radical 
Marxist and anarcho-syndicalist positions, focusing their efforts instead on collective 
bargaining and strengthening of labor rights through legislation. Ties with governing 
parties proved to be an asset in achieving those goals during the period of Keynesian 
macroeconomic management. Indeed, as a number of accounts demonstrate, it was 
precisely the strong alliances between unions and social democratic parties that were 
the driving force behind the construction of generous and redistributive welfare states 
(Hicks 1999; Huber/Stephens 2001; Korpi 1989; Korpi/Palme 1998). The process of 
“political exchange” (Pizzorno 1978) facilitated neocorporatist incomes policies: un-
ions accepted wage moderation in exchange for full employment and the extension of 
social benefits. 
This cooperation functioned smoothly up to the mid-1970s, when the oil shocks and 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system revealed the first cracks in corporatist po-
litical exchange. Pressures intensified during the 1980s when the growing internation-
alization of trade and capital markets, as well as the rise of unemployment and demo-
graphic changes, rendered previous levels of social expenditure increasingly unsus-
tainable. With the rise of the New Right in the US and the UK and the subsequent 
spread of neoliberal ideas and Eurosclerosis arguments, unions and wage bargaining 
institutions were more and more perceived to be the main causes of high inflation, 
slow technological change, and sluggish growth of the European economies. Gradu-
ally, the policy shift to the right was taken up also by social democratic governments. 
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Sooner or later traditionally labor-based parties opted for anti-inflation measures, 
cuts in government spending, privatization, flexibilization of the labor market, and 
welfare retrenchment (Bell/Shaw 2003; Callaghan 2003; Martin/Ross 1999; Piven 
1992). This “rightward move” contradicted the traditional platforms of labor parties 
and led to the weakening of their long-standing alliances with the unions.1 Through-
out the 1990s, most social democratic parties vigorously propagated the necessity of 
modernization and programmatic renewal widely associated with the notions of the 
“Third Way” and the “Neue Mitte.” 
While economic imperatives had undoubtedly prompted this policy turn, they were 
supported by deeper structural changes that cut into the very foundations of the tradi-
tional alliances. A variety of arguments have been put forward to explain the trans-
formation of European social democracy and union–party alliances as one of its major 
elements. While many of these arguments overlap, they can be classified in three 
broad groups that focus on changes in (i) structural-economic parameters, (ii) values, 
and (iii) electoral politics. The first group stresses the importance of such factors as the 
shrinking proportion of the manual working class and the rising share of the service 
sector; the growth of private non-industrial employment and smaller units of produc-
tion; the shift from Fordist manufacturing techniques to more flexible task structures; 
growing occupational diversification; and the increasing importance of middle man-
agement and less hierarchical authority relations (Clark/Lipset 1991; Crouch 1999; 
Piore/Sabel 1984; Piven 1992; Pontusson 1995; Streeck 1991). These trends, it is argued, 
reduce homogeneity and solidarity among workers, thereby weakening class organiza-
tional potentials and undermining the very basis of the traditional union–party alli-
ances. 
The second group of arguments rests on the notion of post-materialist values, which 
are alleged to have become increasingly important in affluent West European societies 
(Inglehart 1977, 1984). The generation brought up during the prosperous period of 
the welfare state is both more concerned with non-materialist issues, such as envi-
ronmentalism, feminism, or consumer protection, and more oriented towards the 
individual rather than the collective (Gorz 1982; Harvey 1989). Rising affluence, so 
the argument goes, reduces the relevance of class cleavages and the potential of tradi-
tional labor parties. 
                                                        
1 The weakening of union–party alliances took various forms, for example, the clear break be-
tween UGT and PSOE in Spain; a clear retreat from the unions on the part of the British La-
bour Party; and the significant 1987 decision to end collective membership of both the Swed-
ish SAP and LO. See, among many others, Astudillo Ruiz (2001), Aylott (2003), Murillo 
(2000) and Piazza (2001).  
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Finally, the third group builds upon these arguments to illuminate a change in elec-
toral politics. Due to broad shifts in economic, structural, and cultural configurations 
in Western Europe, interests are becoming more diversified and cleavages more com-
plicated. Class-based parties can preserve their position only by adapting their strate-
gies to the new environment. With the shrinking of their traditional constituencies, 
labor parties need to reorganize their programs to appeal to new, more diffuse social 
interests (Kitschelt 1994; Offe 1987; Taylor 1993). Operating as rational vote-maxi-
mizers, the parties construct wide electoral coalitions by offering programs that con-
verge on the median voter. In other words, they are being transformed into what 
Kirchheimer termed “catch-all parties” (1966). Moreover, this strategic reorientation 
requires strong party leadership, capable of neutralizing ideologically rooted member-
ship. Hence, these parties are changing not only their electoral and ideological appeal, 
but also their organizational structure. In short, the “mass party” is being replaced by 
the “electoral-professional party” (Panebianco 1988; Katz/Mair 1995). 
All three groups of arguments point to the reduced salience of class issues in post-
industrial societies.2 While the outlined trends have been present across Western 
Europe, their actual impact on union–party alliances – and social democracy more 
broadly – varies among countries. Although fascinating, the question of cross-national 
variation lies outside the scope of this paper.3 Instead, the focus is on similar devel-
opments in the evolution and transformation of West European union–party alliances 
for they provide the background against which I shall examine the special nature of 
these ties in the new democracies of East Central Europe.4 
                                                        
2 See also Clark and Lipset (1991) and Clark et al. (1993). Note, however, that a number of 
accounts have challenged the declining political relevance of class. See, in particular, Hout et 
al. (1993) and Manza et al. (1995). 
3 A number of studies address such cross-country variation. Explanations include: internal 
organizational dynamics of the social democratic parties, especially their “entrenchment” or 
strength of ties with organized labor (Kitschelt 1994; Koelble 1992); differences in economic 
structural variables (Pontusson 1995; Przeworski/Sprague 1986; Howell 2001); variances in 
cleavage structures (Hopkin 2000); and ideological frames that shape social democratic prac-
tices in a path-dependent fashion (Berman 1998). 
4 It should be clear from the outset that the ambition of this paper is not to provide a grand, 
systematic comparison of union–party ties in two parts of Europe. Such an attempt would be 
problematic not only because it would obscure important cross-country variation, even 
within respective regional contexts, but also because it would overlook salient differences be-
tween the two regions with regard to economic development, political and social dynamics, 
and specific historical experiences that shape the very identity and actions of the involved ac-
tors. Instead, what this paper seeks to do is simply to understand the logic of the functioning 
of union–party alliances in contemporary East Central Europe by juxtaposing it to a general 
picture of the development and transformation of these alliances in Western Europe.  
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3 Unions and parties in East Central Europe: Genesis and transformation 
The relationship between unions and political parties in the East has undergone a 
completely different development. At the time when the formation of the first trade 
unions in the West supported the rise of socialist parties, East European societies were 
predominantly agrarian. While social-democratic parties emerged across the region 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, they simply could not rely on the type of 
grassroots support enjoyed by their Western counterparts.5 Due to the low level of 
socio-economic development, the industrial working class was “of limited propor-
tions, generally low-skilled and politically impotent” (Dauderstädt et al. 1999: 22). 
Moreover, the higher salience of religious, ethnic, and national divides, rather than 
class cleavages, did not favor the rise of social democratic parties. In terms of mem-
bership, these parties were far below their counterparts in Western Europe.6 Although 
they managed to achieve higher visibility on the political scene immediately after the 
First World War, this success was only short-lived. In the 1920s and 1930s, social de-
mocratic parties were largely marginalized either through political dictatorships or 
through internal disagreements and the lack of clear programs (Rotschild 1990).7 At 
the same time, trade unions established on the basis of the German model in the 
Western part of the region remained small and politically irrelevant.8 Those further to 
the East were originally more influenced by syndicalist ideas, prominent in the early 
days of the Russian Revolution. By the end of the 1920s, however, the propagators of 
these ideas in Russia had been politically eliminated and the unions had to adopt the 
role of “transmission belts” between the masses and the regime (Myant/Waller 1994). 
Following the Second World War and the Sovietization of East Central Europe, social 
democratic parties ceased to exist: their followers either supported the communists, or 
were subjected to political terror and/or forced into exile. 
                                                        
5 Social democratic/ socialist parties were established in the Czech Republic in 1871; Hungary in 
1890; Poland in 1892; Bulgaria in 1891; Romania in 1893; and Serbia in 1903.  
6 For detailed data on the membership figures of social democratic parties (both in absolute 
terms and as a percentage of the population) in the Western and Eastern parts of Europe in 
the interwar period, see Dauderstädt et al. (1999: 25–26).  
7 An exception was the Czech Republic, where social democrats won the 1920 parliamentary 
elections. After the break with the communists, however, they were significantly weakened but 
nonetheless managed to participate in government during the whole interwar period, except 
for 1926–29. See Dauderstädt et al. (1999: 30–31).  
8 This was a general picture that contrasted sharply with the position of the West European 
trade unions during the same period. However, there were also variations within East Central 
Europe with regard to the strength of trade unions, the Czech Republic again being an impor-
tant outlier. For instance, whereas the Hungarian industrial working class was mainly con-
fined to the Budapest area, a high degree of industrialization in Bohemia made the Czech un-
ions (and the social democratic party which they supported) much stronger. See Kitschelt et 
al. (1999: 96–105).  
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With the introduction of the planned economy, the “transmission belt” model of un-
ionism – endorsed by the Stalinist regime – was applied across East Central Europe. 
Deprived of any real political power, the main task of the unions was to ensure con-
formity to state policies by reaching plan targets and increasing productivity. For this 
work, the Party “rewarded” the unions by assigning them the role of administrators of 
(strictly defined) social and welfare benefits in enterprises. Unions distributed loans 
and in-kind benefits to their members, and controlled access to social and recreational 
facilities (such as kindergartens, sports clubs, and holiday accommodation). Due to 
this extensive welfare role, they enjoyed almost full membership among employees. At 
the same time, however, they had no real bargaining power. Collective agreements 
were regularly signed, but essentially they represented no more than a general en-
dorsement of directives outlined at a higher level (Myant 1994). 
The collapse of communism found the unions largely unprepared to deal with new 
challenges. Within a few months, the old unions had to reorganize themselves along 
democratic lines, with new statutes and new leadership. However, the fact that they 
used to be an important pillar of the system that was now so thoroughly discredited 
called into question the legitimacy of the successor unions and burdened them with a 
rather negative political image (Wessels 1994; Wiesenthal 1996). Independent unions, 
established either towards the end of communism or in the first years of transition, in 
most cases did their best to promote this image even further. The social functions 
performed by the unions during the previous regime were stripped from their hands 
overnight, and the end of compulsory membership led to dramatic losses. At the same 
time, market reforms entailed additional sacrifices: large lay-offs, wage decline, price 
increases, and dramatic welfare cuts. While mitigating such challenges would un-
doubtedly be a daunting task for any labor organization, the situation in postcommu-
nism was particularly acute since the unions had no experience with market-based 
collective bargaining.9 Indeed, both successor and independent unions seemed to be 
utterly paralyzed, albeit for different reasons: while the former had to get rid of the 
“baggage of the past,” carve a space for themselves in the democratic system, and learn 
to play the new “game,” the latter had to find a way of continuing their enthusiastic 
support for the market while simultaneously protecting their membership from its 
unleashed forces. 
                                                        
9 This capacity problem notwithstanding, the unions could not improve their position in the 
labor market by relying on traditional bargaining with well-organized employers’ associations 
because the latter were only under formation and remained generally weak and fragmented. 
The weakness of employers’ organizations and the general reluctance of private employers to 
support higher-level collective bargaining represented an important constraint on the unions 
in effectively pursuing their economic activities. One could plausibly argue that such a con-
text, in a way, might ‘encourage’ the unions to try to achieve their goals through political 
rather than economic activity. Thus paradoxically, although the collapse of communism was 
expected to lead to depoliticization of the unions, the specific structural constraints of the 
postcommunist context might in fact facilitate their further politicization.  
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The unions were not the only actors who faced numerous challenges at the beginning 
of the transition. The emerging political parties also operated under extreme uncer-
tainty. Once the communists were defeated and the electoral market was suddenly 
wide open, these political actors “engaged in exploring what their interests are and 
how to pursue them” (Kitschelt 1992: 9–10). Within a short time, they had to devise 
their programs, decide upon electoral strategies, and invest in building their political 
image. Unlike many political parties in the West, the emerging parties in East Central 
Europe were far from being unitary actors with clear programmatic foci. Broad-based 
anti-communist movements, led by dissident groups, were particularly “colorful.” 
Having originated in the late 1970s and early 1980s around the idea of “antipolitics,” 
which symbolized the struggle of “society” against the “powers,” they comprised rather 
diverse groups. By claiming to represent society as a whole, rather than any particular 
portion of it, these anti-regime movements offered a shelter to “liberal intellectuals, 
conservative patriots, religious zealots, and workers struggling for better living condi-
tions and self-management.” As long as the Communist Party ruled with an iron fist, 
these groups “peacefully cohabited the ‘house of dissent’” (Szelényi et al. 1997: 208). 
However, once the enemy had been defeated and these forces entered democratically 
elected parliaments, divisions became more apparent. Initially, it was such issues as 
national identity, ethnicity, freedom of the individual, and religion that separated 
liberals from conservatives and often prompted different factions to form their own 
parties. While these divisions ran deep, the new political elites were still united with 
regard to the key issues – they all stood for marketization, modernization, democratic 
progress, and prosperity (Innes 2001). 
The strong rejection of anything reminiscent of the old system contributed to the ini-
tial market enthusiasm, thus weakening the potential of economic programs tradi-
tionally associated with the Left (Dauderstädt et al. 1999; Mair 1998). It was only after 
the negative effects of the reforms were widely felt that the economic dimension be-
came a more important part of electoral competition (Szelényi et al. 1997). In some 
cases, most notably Poland and Hungary, the reformed communist parties capitalized 
on the inability of the “natural born democrats” to offer tangible benefits rather than 
empty symbolic politics (Bozóki 2002: 99). However, their promises were soon to be 
replaced by neoliberal economic programs, sometimes even more decisive than those 
implemented by the first democratic governments. Pressed by deep economic crisis 
and eager to join the European Union, governments of the Left and Right became 
hardly distinguishable with regard to economics (Cook/Orenstein 1999). Platforms of 
all significant parties included such catchwords as “return to Europe,” “Europeaniza-
tion,” or “modernization” as the ultimate goals of comprehensive economic reforms. 
Another important characteristic of postcommunist parties was that, unlike many 
West European parties, they were not built “from the ground up.” Instead, they were 
mostly internally-created, top-down, elitist or professional party types (Lewis 1996; 
Mair 1998). Even the post-Solidarity parties lost their social grounding through the 
process of splintering (and sometimes fusion) of various factions of the originally broad 
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movement. Thus, as one observer put it, postcommunist parties are not only parlia-
ment-centered, but essentially “parliament born-and-bred” (Innes 2001: 5). 
These characteristics, in turn, are crucial for understanding the type of linkages with 
mass-level organizations, in particular with trade unions. In the context of the ex-
traordinarily narrow room for competition over economic policy issues, these parties 
were careful not to confine themselves to any special interests that could turn out to 
be political deadweight. While political elites from anti-communist parties considered 
class politics to be unproductive and largely passé, the reformed communist/social-
democratic parties did not want to be seen as the sole representatives of the “remnants 
of the old system.” The fact that the unions, even though declining, were still a con-
siderable source of votes was the main reason various parties did eventually establish 
formal or informal ties with them. However, these ties could hardly be seen as exclu-
sive arrangements, as the parties sought to recruit much wider constituencies and often 
to build cross-class alliances (cf. Merkel 1997). Reminiscent of a “political Noah’s 
Ark,” the leadership of these parties would sometimes combine those who were “mak-
ing a fortune in banking and insurance” with those who represented “workers in such 
declining industries as coal” (Orenstein 1998: 493). 
The end of class politics: The same causes as in the West? 
On the surface, these developments might appear to mimic the established trend in 
the advanced capitalist societies: with class politics on the decline, political parties are 
simply becoming increasingly reluctant to have a strong anchorage in organized labor. 
While this is probably true, it is still questionable to what extent the causes of this 
trend are similar to those in Western Europe. At first glance, as in the West, the recon-
figuration of economies seems to be a relevant factor in postcommunist East Central 
Europe. The industrial sector has been declining, the service sector is gaining in im-
portance, and the number of small and medium-size private enterprises has been 
growing steadily since the beginning of the transition. Undoubtedly, these shifts have 
eroded the organizational basis of trade unions and have entered the calculus of their 
political allies. Two caveats, however, apply to this explanation. First, the sectoral 
composition of economies in East Central Europe is still significantly more favorable 
to the traditional type of unionism than in Western Europe.10 Second, even without 
careful statistical analysis, it is clear that falls in union membership in East Central 
Europe have by far surpassed the extent of structural economic changes.11 Hence, 
                                                        
10 In the 10 accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe, industry provides 32.7% of jobs, 
the service sector 52.8%, and agriculture 14.5%. For the EU-15, this composition is 26.9%, 
68.8%, and 4.4% respectively. See Dauderstädt/Witte (2002). 
11 While comparable union density time series for East Central European countries are not avail-
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union–party alliances might not be affected solely by shifts in economic structures. 
Political behavior also depends on broader cognitive frames, and these certainly figure 
prominently in postcommunist politics. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that the cal-
culus of political parties was not influenced by the prevailing negative image of the 
trade unions. 
The argument about the rise of post-materialist values as a factor indicating the de-
cline of class politics seems less plausible in the context of postcommunism. Origi-
nally, this argument was inspired by the situation in affluent Western societies, but 
one would be hard pressed to make a case that the region whose per capita GNP (at 
PPP) in the early 1990s when compared to Western Europe was lower than both in 
the interwar period and at the end of communism could be categorized as affluent.12 
Moreover, given that since the beginning of the transition unemployment, inequality, 
and poverty have all risen dramatically across the region, it would be difficult to claim 
that post-materialist values have become established (Szelényi et al. 1997). While the 
observable “individualization” in East Central Europe coincides with the global “era 
of ‘post-modern politics’” (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 396), this phenomenon could be a 
consequence of the overall weakness of civil society rather than of the rising wealth 
and affluence. 
Finally, the above discussion of electoral competition and the organizational links of 
political parties in postcommunism indicates the reliance on “expansive electoral 
strategies” (Kitschelt 1992). As in the West, mass parties are out of fashion and many 
parties in the East seem to fit the profile of the catch-all party. While this label is 
largely applicable, two important characteristics differentiate postcommunist catch-all 
parties from those in the advanced European democracies. First, sociologically, the 
catch-all model assumes a society with “relatively satisfied and disinterested citizens” 
and declining class cleavages (Katz 1999: 10). It is doubtful whether these require-
ments are met in East Central Europe. Given the depth of transitional recession and 
sacrifices imposed on a large portion of the population, one would expect citizens to 
be anything but satisfied.13 In addition, while “class” might not be such a relevant 
category in postcommunist politics (Merkel 1997), it is not entirely clear whether this 
is due to the disappearance of class cleavages or rather their slow formation.14 Second 
                                                                                                                                                       
able, it is widely accepted that the fall in unionization levels has been dramatic: from close to 
universal membership in the late 1980s to current levels of 10–35%. At the same time, the 
share of industry in total employment has also declined everywhere, albeit less dramatically. 
For instance, in the four Visegrád countries, this figure was around 40% in 1990 and about 
28% in 2002. See EBRD Transition Report (1999, 2003).  
12 For data see Janos (2001: 230). 
13 Indeed, while market enthusiasm was high at the outset of the transition, later opinion polls 
indicate increasing disappointment rather than satisfaction with market reforms. See Crook et 
al. (2002: 18–24).  
14 Szelényi et al., for instance, argue that the transition from state socialism to market capitalism 
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– and more directly related to the issue of union–party linkages – to become catch-all 
parties West European parties had to shed both their “‘ideological baggage’ and its 
intimate ties with particular organizations” (Katz 1999: 9). By contrast, as Innes ar-
gues, postcommunist parties lack both “the ‘baggage’ of ideological past and the his-
tory of mass membership,” and could be more accurately described as “instant catch-
all parties” (2001: 10). I contend that it is precisely this lack of historically strong root-
edness in societal organizations that opens up a unique opportunity structure for the 
leadership of postcommunist parties when it comes to their relationship with trade 
unions. In what follows I elaborate on this discussion to propose a hypothesis about 
the special nature of postcommunist union–party alliances, and the outcomes they are 
likely to generate. 
4 Managing alliances: Loyalty and power 
The fact that labor-linked parties sometimes opt for policies that adversely affect their 
constituencies is not exclusively a postcommunist phenomenon. Indeed, in the era of 
global capitalism most West European unions have encountered similar challenges, 
albeit in a more gradual fashion. As mentioned earlier, ever since the late 1970s, gov-
ernments in Western Europe – including those on the left – have been moving to-
wards more restrictive monetary and fiscal policies, emphasizing in particular the 
goals of price stability and labor market flexibility. Whereas this neoliberal turn has 
obviously been of a different character and certainly more gradual than in postcom-
munism, it has nonetheless significantly affected long-standing union–party alli-
ances.15 Leaving aside the speed and specific content of reforms, what markedly dis-
tinguishes the experience of postcommunist East Central Europe is that union–party 
alliances lack deep historical roots. Whereas in many West European countries trade 
unions have been linked to political parties for over a century, postcommunist alli-
ances are essentially in their infancy. But, if labor-backed parties in general are mov-
ing towards more or less neoliberal policies, what difference does the duration of a 
union–party relationship make? 
                                                                                                                                                       
can be seen as “a transition from a socialist rank order to a capitalist class structure. Classes 
are not disappearing: they are in the process of becoming” (1997: 204).  
15 In terms of the sharpness of the neoliberal turn and the comprehensiveness of the reforms, the 
experience of Southern European and Latin American unions in the 1980s and early 1990s is 
probably more similar to the challenges faced by postcommunist labor. In many of those 
countries, governments led by historically union-allied parties embarked upon comprehensive 
reforms consisting of monetary and fiscal austerity measures, trade liberalization and price de-
regulation, privatization and industrial restructuring. See, for example, Burgess (1999), 
Fishman (1990), Murillo (2000) and Royo (2003). 
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Like many other relationships, the stability of a union–party relationship rests on the 
fundamental pillars of trust and loyalty.16 Neither of these pillars can be built over-
night. Instead, they tend to derive from a longer period of mutually beneficial ex-
changes. For instance, in the case of an “economic bargain,” affiliated unions will 
prove their loyalty to the governing party by keeping their commitment to wage re-
straint and avoidance of strikes. The party, in turn, will prove its loyalty to the union 
by pursuing favorable policies, delivering tangible benefits to labor, or strengthening 
institutions that increase labor input in policy-making. In the case of a “political bar-
gain,” unions will show their loyalty by supporting the party in elections, while the 
party will stay loyal to the affiliated unions by offering protective legislation or gov-
ernment positions to union leaders.17 As long as each partner sticks to their side of the 
bargain, repeated exchanges of this sort will generate mutual trust and strengthen 
“loyalty bonds” (Murillo 2000: 148–149). It is generally considered that this kind of 
quid pro quo was at the core of union–party relationships during the golden days of 
Keynesian macroeconomic management in Western Europe.18 
At some point, however, external constraints, such as fluctuations in the economic 
conjuncture, might increase uncertainty and thus challenge the basis of the relation-
ship. For instance, in periods of cyclical economic crisis, even a generally committed 
labor-backed party in government might not be able to keep its promises to unions. 
However, the affiliated unions will not necessarily immediately retaliate with indus-
trial actions or by withdrawing their political support for the party. Instead, they 
might be inclined to cooperate since a prolonged experience of interactions yielding 
                                                        
16 In this paper, loyalty is defined as a set of norms and principles – formed through long experi-
ence of interaction – that underpin a sense of obligation, commitment, and responsibility to-
wards the alliance. In the literature the concept of “loyalty” is defined in various ways (see, for 
example, Withey/Cooper 1989; Rusbult et al. 1988). For some authors, loyalty is an attitude 
(shaped through previous experience) that leads one partner in the alliance to believe in the 
good intentions of the other. Other authors refer to loyalty as behavior resulting in specific 
material concessions which indicate the commitment to the goals and needs of the partner in 
the alliance. In Albert Hirschman’s (1970) classic account of the behavior of the clients of a 
declining organization, loyalty is treated as a category influencing the choice between “voice” 
and “exit,” rather than as an alternative to these two options. Loyalty, for instance, would fa-
cilitate voice rather than exit, even if the exit option seems to be less costly. In union–party al-
liances, however, loyalty does not always translate into voice. As this paper will show, under 
specific socio-economic and political conditions, union loyalty towards the party in the alli-
ance might facilitate, to use Hirschman’s terminology, “silence” rather than “voice” (for a 
similar argument in the study of organizations, see Kolarska/Aldrich 1980). For an excellent 
treatment of the concept of loyalty in long-standing union–party alliances and explicit appli-
cation of Hirschman’s scheme to market reforms in Mexico, Venezuela, and Spain, see Bur-
gess (1999).  
17 The conceptualization of union–party exchanges as comprising two sets of bargains comes 
from Howell (2001).  
18 A similar type of exchange existed in Latin America in the era of import-substitution industri-
alization. 
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positive results for both partners feeds union expectations that the party will reward 
them once the economic conditions improve. Thus, taking a short-term risk by coop-
erating might in fact be consistent with long-term union interests (Lange 1984: 106). 
In other words, a longer history of mutually beneficial exchanges, as Burgess puts it, 
allows for “the accumulation of reserves of loyalty that could be tapped in times of 
stress and replenished in times of prosperity” (1999: 110). 
Naturally, an entirely different game emerges in case of a structural economic crisis 
when improvement can be expected only with a major restructuring of the economy. 
In this case, the party is likely to defect repeatedly. Regardless of how large the loyalty 
reserves might be, they are not inexhaustible. In times of “structural pessimism,” 
shared visions and political identities might simply not be enough to sustain coopera-
tion unless they are accompanied by regular pay-offs. In this situation, both partners 
will weigh the benefits of staying in the relationship in its present form against those 
of relationship transformation (or even break-up), discounted for future uncertainties 
(Lange 1984). Parties, in particular, might become increasingly aware that they have 
miscalculated the benefits of a close relationship with the union. A prolonged struc-
tural crisis is likely to lead to divisions within organized labor as some groups will be 
more vulnerable to the inevitable reforms.19 The subsequent erosion of internal soli-
darity, the weakening of the unions and the increasing pool of new interests will enter 
the calculus of labor parties. Their costs deriving from being exclusively oriented to 
trade unions increase progressively. Union leaders, on the other hand, are likely to 
encounter pressure from their constituencies whose sense of betrayal will increase in 
proportion to the length of the crisis. Establishing a distance from the party that is 
undertaking painful reforms might be a rational strategy for union leaders who want 
to avoid being perceived as selling out labor interests. Regardless of whose initiative it 
might be, a growing distance between the traditional partners is the most likely sce-
nario – indeed, it is one that has been encountered in various forms across Western 
Europe since the 1980s.20 
What is crucial here, however, is that even though in Western Europe union–party 
relationships might be transformed or formally ended, the products of these relation-
ships might not disappear so quickly. Where unions have had a long, productive rela-
tionship with the party, union status is likely to be protected by legislation, proce-
dures, or specific forms of participatory institution, none of which are likely to vanish 
                                                        
19 Streeck identifies five types of such intra-labor cleavages that are likely to occur between 
workers in weak and strong sectors, weak and strong firms, and large and small firms, in com-
peting production units and between the “ins” and “outs” (1984: 310–313).  
20 The degree to which the relationship weakens in individual countries is likely to be related to 
the partners’ relative sanctioning power. Several factors might play a role here, including party 
financing, union density, union fragmentation and competition, party competition, political 
alternatives for the unions, and so on.  
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overnight.21 It is precisely this “considerable inertia of developed and long-standing 
institutional structures” (Streeck 1984: 297) that provides a certain safeguard for the 
unions. Having this shield, the unions could embark on a search for strategic innova-
tion that would strengthen their position and improve their chances in direct negotia-
tions with employers.22 This is, for instance, what the Swedish unions have been try-
ing to do by advocating “cross-class alliances” and “wage-earner feminism,” after the 
end of their collective membership in SAP (Howell 2001). In this sense, a formal di-
vorce from the party does not have to be so painful. The unions might still believe that 
their initiatives would be more successful with a left government in power, and thus 
might continue to support the party in elections (Aylott 2002). Indeed, as Esping-
Andersen (1999) has demonstrated, despite the weakening of formal union–party ties 
across Western Europe their strategic electoral alliances have remained largely stable. 
But what happens if there is no long history of mutually beneficial relations? If, when 
faced with uncertainty, both party and unions are expected to take into consideration 
not only the current situation and the future prospects of the economy, but also their 
past experience, how will they react if such experience simply does not exist? What 
happens when bonds of loyalty are still relatively soft, and when there is yet no firmly 
established set of legal, procedural, and institutional safeguards that protect the un-
ions in case the party repeatedly defaults on its promises? This is essentially the case of 
union–party alliances in postcommunist East Central Europe. 
If loyalty is created through a long process of productive exchange, then postcommu-
nist union–party alliances are likely to have poor reserves of loyalty. When such alli-
ances are put under pressure of a protracted transformational recession, the likelihood 
of disloyal behavior increases. As the party might not be able to deliver the expected 
benefits to the unions, the unions might be less willing to exercise self-restraint  
(Ekiert/Kubik 2001; Osa 1998). This is what some students of postcommunism 
warned about at the beginning of the transition. When faced with increasing costs, so 
the argument goes, unions would either engage in strike activities or try to extract 
                                                        
21 Examples include the co-determination system, industry-wide collective bargaining, and ac-
tive participation of union and employers’ organizations in labor law implementation or in 
administering unemployment benefit schemes. In light of the mounting pressures associated 
with contemporary economic and social challenges such institutions have become subject to 
increasing criticism. While it has been evident for some time that in order to overcome the 
crisis and improve competitiveness of national economies, the adjustment and transformation 
of these institutions is inevitable, their actual transformation has been only gradual. The long-
established and solidly embedded institutional architecture of different West European 
economies proved difficult to reform over night. While many components of these systems 
are being gradually transformed, most of the core elements of the respective political econo-
mies are likely to remain in place for a long time to come. For a related discussion in the case 
of Germany, see Hassel /Williamson (2004).  
22 This is certainly not to say that all unions are successful with such innovation. 
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material concessions from its political allies in government. Both actions would, in 
turn, pose a considerable danger to market reforms (Sachs 1993). 
What these arguments overlook, however, is that the likelihood of disloyal behavior 
does not depend solely on the withdrawal of pay-offs, but also on the actual balance of 
power in the relationship. In other words, when the party repeatedly defaults on its 
promises, the affiliated unions are not likely to engage in disloyal behavior if they are 
in a significantly weaker position vis-à-vis their partners. The lack of a strong bargain-
ing muscle on the part of the unions, therefore, creates an exceptional opportunity 
structure for the party leadership. In this situation, it will be the party rather than the 
unions which will have more incentive to behave disloyally. 
Union weakness in postcommunism is attributable to objective factors, such as large-
scale economic restructuring, dramatic erosion of membership, and fragmented, 
competitive union structures, but also to broader normative frames that are responsi-
ble for the negative image of unions. When these factors coincide with limited room 
for economic policy alternatives and the general catch-all character of political parties, 
the unions are not likely to have a considerable sanctioning power vis-à-vis their part-
ners. By contrast to Western Europe where the parties depended much more on their 
union allies in the early stages of their relationship, it is the inverse dependency rela-
tionship that characterizes these alliances in postcommunism. 
Due to such power asymmetries, the terms of exchange in these alliances are expected 
to be less favorable to the unions. In essence, the unions trade their quiescence and 
support for reform for not much more than a particular “vision of the future” out-
lined by the party (cf. Valenzuela 1991). As opposed to the early alliances in the West, 
the party is unlikely to offer immediate tangible benefits to labor. What the party 
might offer – to ensure that this deal is not only made, but that it also lasts – are small 
side payments (such as parliamentary and government positions) to union leaders. In 
a sense, this is a new game being played by the old rules: as in the transmission-belt 
model of unionism, union leaders are expected to ensure that their constituencies 
comply with economic reforms crafted by neoliberal technocrats in government min-
istries. 
Effectively, the result is union subordination to the party, which is then likely to be 
directly transmitted to the process of national-level tripartite bargaining. Thus, by 
contrast to some West European countries where these alliances strengthened the role 
of unions in neo-corporatist policy-making, in the postcommunist context strong 
union–party ties are more likely to produce the opposite effect. De facto limited union 
autonomy goes against the principles of tripartite exchange as a process of bargaining 
between independent social partners. The situation is even starker when competing 
unions have diverse partisan identities. In this case, union political divisions are likely 
to impede constructive cooperation and further hinder social bargaining, thus ob-
structing the potential creation of legal and institutional safeguards for the unions. 
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The next section probes these arguments on the cases of Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic. 
5 Protecting the workers or protecting the market? 
With the collapse of communism, trade unions embarked upon various strategies that 
led to distinct national patterns in terms of their insertion in the new political system. 
Some unions chose to build strong alliances with political parties, thus focusing on 
parliamentary representation of their interests. Others rejected a direct engagement in 
politics and opted instead for direct bargaining with representatives of the state and 
employers within newly established tripartite institutions. In simple terms, labor lead-
ers had to decide whether to focus on strengthening the political or the industrial role 
of their union. In what follows, I provide a brief analysis of the dynamics of three 
cases in East Central Europe in which labor leaders made different choices. To discern 
whether strong union–party alliances have been beneficial for the unions, I trace po-
litical processes and the dynamics of labor politics since the beginning of transition. 
Benefits for the unions are judged in terms of policy outcomes and the extent of actual 
union inclusion and influence in the policy-making process.23 The analysis is in-
                                                        
23 I assess whether links with parties have been beneficial for unions by looking at policy out-
comes and the inclusiveness of the policy-making process rather than conventional indicators 
of union strength, such as union density and bargaining coverage, for two principal reasons. 
First, complete and comparable sets of data on union membership, density, and bargaining 
coverage since the beginning of transition are not available. The ILO and the EBRD have lim-
ited data on union density based on estimates, self-reported figures by union headquarters, 
and secondary sources, which seriously limits their comparability. EIRO, on the other hand, 
started reporting on these countries only in 2002. These data sets on union density and bar-
gaining coverage start with 1999, and EIRO explicitly cautions against using these data for 
strict comparative purposes as they are derived from different sources, often present only es-
timates, and/or are calculated in different ways. Finally, large-scale surveys to determine un-
ion density have been done only for a very limited number of years (for example, World Value 
Survey [WVS] for 1995–1997; International Social Survey Program [ISSP] for 1996, 1998, and 
2000; and European Social Survey [ESS] for 2002–2003) and they do not always cover the 
same countries (for example, WVS excludes the Czech Republic and Hungary, while ISSP 
does not offer data for Hungary and Poland in the 2000 survey). In general, though, these 
sources indicate that from close to universal membership during communism, by 2002 union 
density had dropped to approximately 30% in the Czech Republic, 20% in Hungary, and 10–
15% in Poland. Second, dramatic drops in union density and bargaining coverage are related 
to a number of socio-economic changes associated with postcommunist transformation, 
namely drastic reductions of the public sector, an increasing share of small and medium-size 
private enterprises, the abolition of compulsory union membership, a negative image of un-
ions in postcommunism, weak union recruiting strategies, and the weakness and slow forma-
tion of employers’ organizations willing to enter into regular bargaining with unions. All these 
factors have contributed to the general weakening of unions in East Central Europe, and it 
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formed by a large number of secondary sources, public statements, party and union 
programs and documents, and a set of interviews I carried out with union representa-
tives and public officials between 1999 and 2002 in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic. 
Poland 
The politicization of unions in Poland is certainly unmatched elsewhere in East Cen-
tral Europe. Both major union centers – Solidarity and the OPZZ – formed strong 
alliances with political parties. The Solidarity union was incorporated in the first de-
mocratic government and the union representatives had their own parliamentary 
group. Moreover, the charismatic union leader Lech Wałęsa won the first presidential 
elections. With the splintering of the Solidarity movement, the union even established 
its own party under the leadership of Marian Krzaklewski. This group was later to 
form the core of Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) that won the 1997 parliamentary 
elections. In the meantime, the reformed successor union OPZZ crafted an alliance 
with the social-democratic SLD that won the 1993 and 2001 elections. Some OPZZ 
leaders received political appointments, while in the second parliament, more than 
one-third of SLD deputies were OPZZ representatives (Orenstein 1998). 
Such extreme union involvement in politics led some to characterize Poland as a “un-
ionocracy” which was bound to endanger economic reforms (Kubicek 2004; Ost 2004). 
However, a closer look reveals that strong alliances with political parties did not bring 
much to the unions. After fifteen years of transformation unemployment is hovering 
around 19%, while despite the growth of productivity, it took more than a decade for 
real wages to barely reach their 1989 level.24 Notwithstanding the formal existence of 
the national tripartite institution, sporadic neocorporatist bargaining has always been 
problematic and has yielded hardly any significant gains for the unions (Avdagic 2005 
forthcoming). Moreover, not only were the union leaders ineffective in using their 
political position to extract noteworthy policy concessions from the government, but 
paradoxically they frequently showed overwhelming support for neoliberal reforms. 
                                                                                                                                                       
would be difficult to disentangle their effects. While union political involvement might have 
had an effect on union density, it would be impossible to establish the extent to which union–
party links have contributed to the decline in union membership. Thus, policy outcomes and 
the inclusiveness of policy-making processes can be considered to be more “direct” measures 
of benefits that unions can potentially derive from their links to political parties.  
24 See European Commission, Economic Forecasts for the Candidate Countries, Spring 2002 
(European Economy: Enlargement Paper no. 9), European Commission, <http:/ /www.euro-
pa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/enlargement_papers/2002/elp09en.pdf> 
(accessed February 5, 2004) and UNICEF (2003). 
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Despite the high visibility of union representatives in Polish politics, their direct influ-
ence on the design of reforms was minimal. During the Mazowiecki government, the 
task of economic policy-making was reserved for a small group of neoliberal techno-
crats led by Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz. It was this group that in cooperation 
with IMF experts designed the infamous shock therapy, which focused on radical sta-
bilization and liberalization while leaving the design of a proper social safety net for 
later stages of the reform. The promises given to the unions during the Round Table 
talks, most notably regarding the indexation of wages and self-management provi-
sions, were annulled overnight. Instead, the combined effects of price liberalization 
and a tight incomes policy resulted in a dramatic drop in real wages, while the cut in 
enterprise subsidies and a squeeze of domestic credit contributed to the rapid rise of 
unemployment. 
Rather than objecting to such hardships, Solidarity union leaders surprised interna-
tional observers and wholeheartedly supported the shock therapy. Wałęsa repeatedly 
assured union constituencies that the “pain of the Balzerowicz plan would last only 
three months” and that these measures were in the long-term interests of workers 
(Pollert 1999: 159). Whereas at that time the Hungarian and Czechoslovak govern-
ments had already established neocorporatist bargaining institutions, both the Polish 
government and the leaders of the Solidarity union argued that only a “market with-
out adjectives” could solve their problems.25 
Their union having originated in the long struggle against communism, many Soli-
darity activists argued that any relaxation of the Balzerowicz plan would lead back to 
some form of undesirable state regulation. The initial market euphoria was so strong 
that the unions were soon portrayed as a “backward, retrograde class of yesterday” 
whose power needed to be curtailed if any progress was to take place (Kubicek 2004: 
132). Indeed, at the first Solidarity Congress in 1989, even union president Wałęsa 
pointed to the dangers of strong unionism by giving a speech that would surely have 
bewildered his union colleagues in the West: “We will not catch up with Europe if we 
build a strong union.”26 
Given the strength of neoliberal discourse and the completely discredited Left, the 
Solidarity union leaders effectively acted as advocates of reform (Meardi 2002). Some 
of them did it out of conviction; many others became directors or even ministers 
overnight (Gortat 1994: 119). Only when the effects of the reform were widely felt did 
                                                        
25 One Solidarity activist eloquently expressed this unlimited support for the market: “In Po-
land’s return to Europe the economic and psychological revolution has to take place first, and 
this means nineteenth-century capitalism with its primitive accumulation of capital, exploita-
tion and inequalities; then we can talk of the more modern forms of state and economic or-
ganization,” J. Surdykowski, “Between Democracy and the Polish Hell,” Gazeta Wyborcza no. 
180 (1990), quoted in Kowalik (2001: 248). 
26 Quoted in Ost (2004).  
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the Solidarity leadership come under attack from other unions (in particular the rising 
OPZZ) and eventually from its own rank-and-file who organized a series of strikes (cf. 
Merkel 1994). Pressured by rising discontent and with accusations of having betrayed 
its constituencies, the Solidarity leadership had no other option but to distance itself 
from the market discourse and finally to join in the protests. Consequently, the union 
leader Krzaklewski suddenly employed a completely different rhetoric: “We must 
stand for the union. Supporting a political party would result in a limitation of trade 
unionists’ rights or even the elimination of the union.”27 The friction in the union–
party alliance culminated in the vote of no confidence that finally brought the gov-
ernment down. But such determination on the part of the unions did not last long. 
When the 1993 elections brought the Social Democrats to power, a similar dynamic of 
union subordination continued within the SLD–OPZZ alliance.28 The fragmented 
Solidarity, at the same time, repeatedly declared ideological disagreements with both 
the new government and OPZZ, and refused to negotiate in the newly established 
tripartite council. Instead of focusing on industrial relations issues and trying to act 
like a ‘proper union,’ the Solidarity leadership once again chose to play a primarily 
political role. Convinced that the tripartite council could not be a sufficient domain 
for union representation, the Solidarity leadership concentrated their efforts on build-
ing a new “truly union-led political block,” AWS, which won the 1997 elections.29 
Sixty-two out of 199 AWS representatives in the parliament came from the Solidarity 
union.30 However, far from keeping its promise to represent union interests, the AWS 
– an alliance between the union and over thirty small political parties – proclaimed 
itself a “right-wing patriotic” group standing for Christian values and free-market 
principles. Surprisingly for an alliance built around a trade union, there were no sig-
nificant labor issues in the AWS electoral program. Moreover, the AWS formed a coa-
lition with the Freedom Union, whose leader Balzerowicz once again assumed the post 
of Finance Minister and designed a new package of fiscal reforms, unfavorable to tra-
ditional union constituencies. In addition, the AWS initiated a number of legislative 
measures and significant restructuring efforts that would drastically reduce the min-
ing sector and emasculate unions in the education and health sectors (Robertson 2004: 
261). This time, it was the OPZZ which left the tripartite council, complaining about 
the government’s ideological hostility and unwillingness to negotiate with the social 
                                                        
27 Quoted in Jackiewicz (1996: 125).  
28 Author’s interview with Juliusz Gardawski, Warsaw School of Economics and Institute of 
Public Affairs (Warsaw: November 7, 2002). See also Bartosz (1996). The findings of a 1994 
survey indicate that almost 75% of union activists (both Solidarity and OPZZ) “saw it as part 
of their role as unionists to explain the rigors of market reform to the rank and file” (see Ost/
Weinstein 1999: 13). 
29 Author’s interview with Bogdan Kubiak, Presidium NSZZ Solidarity, National Commission 
Gdansk (Warsaw: November 4, 2002). 
30 See Foreign Labor Trends, Washington DC: U.S. Department of Labor, 1997–1998, p. 11.  
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partners.31 At the same time, many Solidarity union leaders who simultaneously held 
political posts found social dialogue unnecessary because they believed that “they them-
selves represent sensitivities and imagination of society” (Pánków/Gąciarz 2001: 24). 
By the end of the 1990s, 72% of union members believed that Polish unions were 
ineffective in defending workers’ interests. Both unions were charged with excessive 
politicization and Solidarity leaders in particular were perceived as representing their 
own interests rather than the interests of the rank-and-file.32 By 2002, only about 6% 
of the adult population in Poland belonged to a trade union.33 
Hungary 
The strategies of the more fragmented Hungarian unions have not been so clear-cut. 
In contrast to Poland, the so-called independent anti-communist unions – most no-
tably LIGA and MOSZ – were never particularly strong. Dominated by dissidents, the 
Hungarian anti-communist movement did not have such an encompassing character 
and correspondingly the unions’ role in politics was weaker than in Poland. However, 
ties between the unions and political parties did develop. MOSZ established links with 
the populist wing of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), and the MOSZ 
chairman entered the first parliament on the MDF ticket (Bruszt 1995). At the same 
time, LIGA, whose representatives participated in the Round Table talks, initially had 
strong informal links to the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). The old official un-
ion center SZOT was reformed and divided into four new union confederations: 
MSZOSZ, SZEF, ASZSZ, and ÉSZT. The largest of them, MSZOSZ, established a for-
mal alliance, based on common “leftist values,” with the Hungarian Socialist Party 
(MSZP) (Rácz 1993: 662). 
Given the limited size and relative weakness of the allied MOSZ, the first MDF-led 
government could not secure a broad endorsement of reforms through the same 
strategy as the Polish government.34 Instead, deeply divided unions were invited to 
                                                        
31 Author’s interview with Ryszard Łepik, Vice-President of the OPZZ (Warsaw, November 6, 
2002). See also ‘The Black Paper of Social Dialogue in Poland” (Warsaw: OPZZ, 1999).  
32 Center for Social Opinion Research (CBOS), “Opinie o zwiazkach zawodowych” (Opinions 
about trade unions) (Warsaw: CBOS, 2000), <http:/ /www.cbos.org.pl> (accessed December 
18, 2002).  
33 See Gardawski (2002). For approximate union density levels in the EU and candidate coun-
tries, see Ladó (2002). According to the latter report, the 2002 union density levels in Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic were around 15%, 20%, and 30% of employment respec-
tively.  
34 Author’s interview with Csaba Őry, former President of LIGA (Budapest: July 12, 2002). Simi-
larly, Imre Palkovics, MOSZ President and member of the MDF Parliamentary faction during 
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negotiate within the tripartite council, which according to some observers served as an 
important instrument of social peace (Héthy 1999; Ladó 1996). In the first four years 
of transition, the social partners regularly signed tripartite agreements, albeit mostly 
limited to incomes policy. At the same time, however, the relationship between the 
unions was highly conflictual due to the unresolved issue of redistribution of com-
munist union assets (Bruszt 1995). While more tangible, material concerns were at the 
heart of these conflicts, they were often buttressed by arguments about ideological 
differences, albeit in a much milder form than in Poland. The government used this 
opportunity to exacerbate the conflicts by passing legislation on the redistribution of 
union assets aimed at weakening the biggest union MSZOSZ, which by then had de-
veloped strong ties to the increasingly popular socialist MSZP. Thus, even though the 
union conflicts initially mainly concerned organizational and financial matters, they 
eventually turned into an important political issue (Avdagic 2004, chap. 4). 
When the MSZP won the 1994 elections, the president of MSZOSZ, Sándor Nagy, ran 
second on the Socialist party list. In the context of a deep economic crisis, many be-
lieved that the strong union–party alliance would provide a solid foundation for nego-
tiations on a broad social pact. Indeed, such negotiations were initiated by the new 
MSZP-led government, but when they proved to be more complicated than expected, 
the idea of a social pact was abandoned. Under pressure from the worsening eco-
nomic situation and internal government conflicts, the MSZP turned its back on the 
union and instead decided to rely on an expert group of so-called “pragmatic problem 
solvers,” most notably Finance Minister Lajos Bokros and President of the National 
Bank György Surányi (Inglot 2003: 227). The resulting set of shock-therapy measures, 
widely known as the “Bokros package,” was “introduced in a putsch-like manner” 
(Bozóki 2002: 104). Not only were the unions excluded from the design of the pack-
age, but the door was shut even to the representatives of the Ministry of Labor.35 
MSZOSZ’s president tried to convince dissatisfied union constituencies that there was 
no alternative to the austerity measures, which included a 12% cut in real wages and 
serious welfare retrenchment.36 At the same time, the party leadership tried to justify 
their choice by arguing that “they had to introduce capitalism in order to be ‘real So-
cialists’ later on” (Bozóki 2002: 105). 
A few months later, Sándor Nagy resigned from his union post. While he openly de-
clared MSZOSZ’s disappointment with the failure of the socialist-led government to 
                                                                                                                                                       
the 1990–94 period, claims in an interview that the government simply could not judge the 
power of the divided unions, and therefore opted for tripartism (for this and a number of 
other interviews with Hungarian trade union leaders, see Polgár 2002). 
35 Author’s interview with Mária Ladó, Director of EU Integration Department, Ministry of 
Employment and Labor (Budapest: September 21, 2002). 
36 The idea of putting the union leaders in the service of selling the austerity measures to the 
rank-and-file was advocated by the neoliberal wing of the MSZP, led by László Békesi. See 
Andor (1996). 
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“stand up for leftist values,” observers generally maintained that his resignation was 
the result of pressure from union activists who had criticized Nagy for excessive po-
litical involvement and his failure to properly represent union interests.37 Still, there 
was no reversal of the austerity measures as a “monetarist, modernizing wing” of the 
MSZP took the lead by propagating “Europeanization,” “Westernization,” and “catch-
ing-up” (Bozóki 2002: 104–115). The weakened and divided unions posed no obstacle 
when the subsequent right-wing government – which regularly portrayed unions as a 
“Bolshevik travesty”38 – introduced legal changes that drastically reduced the role of 
the tripartite council, thus effectively excluding the unions from the most important 
areas of economic policy-making. 
Czech Republic 
Finally, the Czech union leadership chose the strategy of political non-alignment. The 
major trade union center ČSKOS was established on the ruins of the communist un-
ion organization. However, while the union leadership was replaced, the confedera-
tion largely retained its former structures, as well as considerable material assets. 
Rather than establishing ties with political parties, the union leadership consistently 
promoted depoliticization.39 This choice was made for two primary reasons. First, the 
leadership perceived political independence as the only way to get rid of the commu-
nist image and build a modern union. Second, the parallel experience of Solidarity 
convinced the leadership that strong alliances with a party would almost certainly lead 
to union subservience.40 The unions supported the market reforms, but insisted on 
strong safeguards in the transitional period, which were to be formulated through 
“negotiations and agreement without ‘grandiose gestures and empty phrases’” (Myant 
1994: 65). 
                                                        
37 Zsófia Szilágyi, “Head of Largest Hungarian Trade Union Federation Quits,” OMRI Daily 
Digest, no. 204 (October 19, 1995), available at <http:/ /www.omri.cz/OMRI.html>. 
38 Author’s interview with Dimitrina Dimitrova, Senior Workers’ Specialist, ILO-CEET (Buda-
pest: May 12, 1999). See also “The Activity of the Orbán Government – As Trade Unions See 
It” (Budapest: LIGA, 1999), and MSZOSZ’s 2000 report “Evaluation of the Economic and So-
cial Situation in Hungary” (Budapest: MSZOSZ, 2000).  
39 While ČMKOS has had a productive relationship with the Social Democratic party, no formal 
links between the two organizations have been established. For a clear statement of the un-
ion’s insistence on political independence, see ČMKOS Program for 1998–2002 (Prague: 
ČMKOS, 1998). It is also worth noting that the new statute of the Czech tripartite council 
(RHSD) applies the criterion of political non-alignment of the social partners as one of the 
main determinants of whether a group is representative or not. See Human Development Re-
port (1999). 
40 Author’s interview with Zdenek Málek, ČMKOS Vice-President (Prague: November 18, 
2002). 
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Initially, the union’s insistence on tripartite negotiations was not welcomed by some 
members of the government, especially the neoliberal Finance Minister Václav Klaus. 
However, unlike in Poland and Hungary, a group of politicians that had more affinity 
with social-democratic values – namely Prime Minister Marian Čalfa and Minister of 
Labor Petr Miller – had the upper hand. The first tripartite agreement presented a 
comprehensive social pact which rested on a low-wage and low-unemployment com-
promise, providing an important foundation for the overall transformation strategy in 
the Czech Republic.41 In addition, unions secured largely favorable labor legislation 
and the right to supervise and administer the implementation of active labor market 
policies, which significantly contributed to sustaining relatively high employment 
levels (Avdagic 2005; Orenstein 1996; Stark/Bruszt 1998). 
After the Velvet Divorce from Slovakia, the Czech unions were subjected to more 
open pressure by the new government led by Václav Klaus. However, the broader 
legitimacy that the unions had earned since the beginning of the transition, as well as 
the readiness of the union leadership – in particular Richard Falbr, who was some-
times even referred to as “Father of the Workers” – to lead the protests against further 
welfare cuts, as well as against legislative attempts to curtail union bargaining rights, 
worked against the Klaus government.42 Faced with the worsening economic condi-
tions, growing union assertiveness, and public approval of union actions, the govern-
ment promised an extended role for tripartism and offered its support for the imple-
mentation and enforcement of tripartite agreements. 
In 1997, around three-quarters of employees expressed their confidence in their un-
ion. The number of those in the general population who saw unions as either essential 
or necessary rose from 75% in 1994 to 82% in 1997 (Hála et al. 2002: 56, 22). With 
the formation of the social democratic government, ČMKOS further strengthened its 
role in the tripartite council. A large-scale survey undertaken in 1999 indicates a 
rather high level of confidence in the unions (42.5%), considerably higher than the 
confidence expressed in either parliament (31.4%) or the government (33.2%) (Ve-
černík 2001: 50). 
                                                        
41 While wages were initially set low, real wages grew steadily and reached their 1989 level as 
early as 1996. In contrast, neither Hungary nor Poland regained 1989 wage levels during the 
1990s. At the same time, unemployment rates in the Czech Republic were exceptionally low: 
unemployment remained under 4% in 1997, and even after the financial crisis unemployment 
remained at single-digit levels, roughly comparable to Hungary. For more precise data, see 
UNICEF (2003). 
42 Author’s interviews with: Vít Samek, Advisor to the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs (Pra-
gue: November 20, 2002); Martin Potůček, Center for Political Science, Charles University 
(Prague: November 18, 2002); and Jiŕí Večerník, Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of 
Sciences (Prague: November 18, 2002). For a more systematic analysis of union–government 
interactions in the Czech Republic, including a detailed account of legislative and policy pro-
posals put forward by the ODS–ODA government, see Avdagic (2004b, chap. 6). 
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6 Conclusions 
By juxtaposing the historical development of the relationship between trade unions 
and political parties in Western and East Central Europe, this paper reveals variations 
in the nature and outcomes of union–party alliances. I have argued that in contrast to 
traditional union–party alliances in Western Europe, postcommunist alliances are not 
only considerably different, but also work to the detriment of labor. 
The argument presented here underscores the importance of a long experience of 
mutually beneficial exchanges that reinforce loyalty and trust between unions and 
their political allies. Economic imperatives are always an important challenge to un-
ion–party alliances. However, the way in which these challenges impact such alliances 
varies according to the duration of a productive relationship. In those West European 
countries where such relationships have been historically strong, loyalty tends to be 
greater. Moreover, in such relationships the unions were able to secure important 
institutional, legal, and procedural safeguards that provide a cushion in times of pro-
longed crisis when loyalty wears thin. In postcommunist East Central Europe, the 
absence of historically strong alliances indicates low levels of loyalty and trust to start 
with. In such conditions, the response to market challenges depends mainly on the 
balance of power between the partners in the alliance. Due to the weakness of unions 
in postcommunism, it is the parties, rather than the unions, who default on their 
promises under the pressure of market reforms. 
This is not to say that contemporary union–party alliances in Western Europe are 
without problems. Indeed, as the paper documents, these alliances nowadays are a far 
cry from the Keynesian era and the golden days of political exchange. Thus, in a way, 
ECE unions had the misfortune not only to enter the democratic system with their 
own crisis-ridden economies, but also at a time when West European unions had al-
ready started their retreat under pressure from globalization, competitiveness, and 
welfare state retrenchment. In many respects, therefore, the contemporary alliances in 
both parts of Europe share many similar challenges. But while West European unions 
could still hold on to a set of well-entrenched institutions, laws, and procedures 
which, while changing, are unlikely to disappear overnight, the prospects for ECE 
unions look much more dramatic since they are encountering strong pressures in the 
absence of such firmly-embedded institutional arrangements. 
In such a situation, this paper argues, one of the key factors influencing the fate of 
unions in ECE was the choice their respective leadership made with regard to estab-
lishing or abstaining from formal alliances with political parties. While undoubtedly 
postcommunist transformation has weakened unions everywhere across ECE, leader-
ship choices have in an important way influenced the amount of sacrifices borne by 
the unions. As a test of plausibility, I have presented empirical evidence from the three 
leading reformers – Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic – in which the strength 
of union–party alliances varies. The findings support my argument. Where the unions 
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established strong alliances with political parties (most notably in Poland, and to a 
lesser extent in Hungary), the union leaders were regularly co-opted and unable to 
extract tangible concessions for the rank-and-file. Where the union leadership kept its 
distance from political parties and made the neo-corporatist framework the main 
arena of their national-level activities (as was the case in the Czech Republic), the un-
ions managed to secure more favorable policy and legal provisions. Moreover, the 
findings indicate that excessive politicization of unions hinders the institutionaliza-
tion of tripartite bargaining. The case of Poland illustrates best how strong union–
party ties obstruct the process of independent social bargaining as union leaders si-
multaneously represent two sides with potentially conflicting interests: the govern-
ment and their own rank and file. Further research is needed to explore the extent to 
which these propositions hold in other countries of East Central Europe. 
Another avenue of research that deserves attention concerns cross-national divergence 
with regard to the strength of union–party ties. By focusing on the consequences of 
these ties, this paper pays little attention to the underlying causes of such variation. In 
order to understand different preferences and strategies of union leaders, but also of 
political entrepreneurs within the parties, one would need to explore the importance 
of the following factors: specific experiences of communism, in particular regime–
opposition dynamics; pre-war legacies, especially the level of socio-economic devel-
opment and the length of democratic experience; the character of party systems and 
the main issues of programmatic competition in the new democracies; the structure of 
labor movements and inter-union dynamics; variation of economic-structural attrib-
utes; and the role of international agencies in structuring policy choices. 
Finally, the analysis presented in this paper raises the question of sustainability of 
postcommunist union–party alliances. Will the ongoing economic pressures deepen 
the frictions within alliances and eventually lead to break-ups, as was the case in 
Spain? What are the prospects for political learning on the part of trade unions? Are 
politicized unions likely to abandon or downplay their partisan strategies in favor of 
more flexible, capacity-building efforts? Will EU entry and EMU requirements facili-
tate a stronger reliance on tripartite institutions as instruments of consensus building? 
While no conclusive answers can be given at this point, there are some indications 
that such political learning might be taking place. In Poland, for instance, both Soli-
darity and OPZZ recently publicly acknowledged that their direct involvement in 
politics has not been successful. Even though their ties to the parties have not been 
severed, the unions have indeed minimized active participation in politics. However, 
it is debatable whether these initiatives are the product of independent political learn-
ing. What seems more likely is that they are a by-product of growing horizontal com-
petition, most notably from the newly established confederation, Forum, that repre-
sents those critical of the partisan strategies followed by the two unions. At present, it 
is questionable whether these developments will lead to a reversal of the established 
mode of unions’ political insertion. 
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